Abstract-In this paper, the author describes a security property for trusted multilevel systems, restrictiveness, which restricts the inferences a user can make about sensitive information. This property is a hookup property, or composable, meaning that a collection of secure restrictive systems when hooked together form a secure restrictive composite system. The author argues that the inference control and composability of restrictiveness make it an attractive choice for a security policy on trusted systems and processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
M UL TILEVE~ security requires that .sensitive information be dIsclosed only to authonzed personnel. In the "paper world," this is enforced by assigning to each document and each employee a security level indicating sensitivity and authority. Commonly used levels in the government are unclassified, confidential, secret, and top _secret. The levels form a partially ordered set, so that an employee can be said to be authorized to read a document only if his level is greater than or equal to that of the document.
For information processing systems multilevel security becomes more complicated, because not all information is in the form of documents and not all consumers of information are employees. Generally for such systems the problem of multilevel security consists of two aspects:
1) Access control-determining who can see information of a given sensitivity leaving the system.
2) Correct labeling-determining the sensitivity of information entering and leaving the system.
The second issue, correct labeling, becomes much more important in computer systems because of the possible presence of Trojan Horse programs. A Trojan Horse program is a malicious program that when run by a high level user will try surreptitiously to obtain classified information from that user and convey it to an accomplice, usually the unauthorized user who programmed the Trojan Horse. These programs often masquerade as useful programs such as word processors or compilers.
Rather than inspect each program on a system to see if it is a Trojan Horse program (it may not be possible to decide by inspection whether a program is a Trojan Horse or not), people instead try to build computer systems which are secure even in the presence of malicious programs. In this paper we will describe a security property that addresses these issues, called restrictiveness, which is composable, This means that for a collection of trusted processes "hooked up" to make a system, or for a collection of system "hooked up" to make a network, the system or network is secure if each component is secure.
U sing restrictiveness as a definition of security for trusted systems provides confidence in building large, complex systems from smaller, easier to verify trusted components. Security is modularized and so becomes more manageable. We first consider two earlier models for security, and point out some of their shortcomings.
A. The Bell-LaPadula Model: Trusted and Untrusted Processes
The issues of access control and correct labeling are addressed by the Bell-LaPadula model [1] . In this model, all entities involved with a computer system-users, files, programs, etc.-are divided into two classifications: subjects and objects. Subjects are the active entities, such as users and processes, which are capable of reading and modifying system state information, while objects are passive containers for information, such as files. Subjects which are processes are further divided into trusted processes and untrusted processes. 1) Rules for Untrusted Subjects: To enforce security for untrusted processes, Bell-LaPadula requires that every object and every untrusted process be assigned a security level. The model then demands that a) An untrusted process may only read from objects of lower or equal security level. (Motto: Read down.) b) An untrusted process may only write to (or modify) objects of greater or equal security level. (Motto: Write up.)
The read down rule insures that a process is only allowed to read information it is entitled (by its security classification) to read. The write up rule ensures that all objects are correctly labeled; it is impossible to put information into an object which comes from a source whose level is higher than the security label on the object.
In the Bell-LaPadula model, users are interpreted as untrusted subjects, except that allowance is made for users to act at any security level less than their maximum. For example, a secret user may login as a secret or unclassified subject, but not as atop_secret subject.
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Trusted processes are needed whenever an activity potentially involves infonnation at several different security levels. For example, the file server must be able to read and write files at all different levels, and so cannot possibly be bound by the access control rules given above. In the Bell-LaPadula model, the need for such multilevel processes was recognized, but no precise security rules for the behavior of such processes were given.
To fill this gap, it is desirable to have a security property for a trusted process that guarantees that infonnation leaving the process is correctly labeled: that high-level infonnation does not "leak" into low-level outputs. We next consider a candidate for such a property.
B. Deducibility Security
A multilevel process is a system which takes in information of different security levels, processes it and outputs infonnation of different security levels. Note that this description can equally well describe a trusted process, or an entire computer system, or a network of computer systems. A general framework for defining security for such systems, called deducibility security, is found in Sutherland [9] . We give an infonnal description of a special case of Sutherland's model.
We assume that all the sensitive infonnation contained in a process enters the process in the fonn of discrete inputs labeled with a security level indicating their sensitivity, and that infonnation leaves the process in the fonn of labeled outputs. 1 The word event will be used to refer to an input or an output.
For each security level l we will call the events of level less than or equal to l the view for that level, and all other events we will say are hidden from that level. By the assumption that access control is enforced on the untrusted parts of the system, we can know that users of levell are unable to see any events outside their own view. The hidden events for a level l are the inputs made by users of higher (or incomparable) level. Under these circumstances, we will say that a multilevel process is deducibility secure if for each security level l and for every sequence of events possible in some history of the process:
The information contained in the events in the view for level l does not reveal anything about information in inputs hidden from level l. ' We are ignoring the possibility that new sensitive infonnation might be created inside the process. To consider this possibility would go beyond the present paper.
To fonnalize this statement, it is necessary to say what it means for one set of observations (the sequence of events in the view of some level) not to reveal anything about some other source of infonnation (the sequence of inputs hidden from the level). In Goguen-Meseguer's noninterference policy [3] , this was fonnalized by saying (in our tenninology) that if one removes all the hidden inputs the observations in the view remain unchanged. This is not as general as one would like, since it is only meaningful for detenninistic systems (ones where what is observed is completely detennined by the inputs). A more general definition is to say that any possible set of observations is consistent with any possible sequence of hidden inputs. (That is, it is impossible for a user of level l to "rule out" any sequence of hidden inputs.) We choose this more general definition, since we intend to apply it in cases, such as concurrency, where there is nondeterminism.
Deducibility security prevents leaks due to Trojan Horses. If an entire system is deducibility secure including any Trojan Horses that may be lurking around, and it initially has no classified infonnation in it, then no unauthorized user of that system will ever learn any classified through the system. In other words, any system which allows illegal infonnation flow through the system is not deducibility secure. The infonnal argument goes as follows:
Suppose that a low level user learns through the system some piece of high level infonnation on the system. This means that the user's view of the system behavior, call it b, has revealed that some condition C holds for the system, and the fact that this condition holds is classified infonnation. Since we are only considering systems which do not create any new classified infonnation internally, if C holds, then there must have been an earlier moment at which high level infonnation was put into the system by high level users; some action must have been taken by the high level user which caused condition C to hold.
Therefore, behavior b allows the low level user to infer C, which allows him to infer that high level users perfonned some action. So the high level behavior do nothing can be ruled out. Since some high level behavior can be ruled out, the system is not deducibility secure.
If deducibility security prevents all leaks due to Trojan Horses, then what more could one want in a definition for multilevel security? Well, in practical tenns, one does not verify everything, one only verifies certain "security relevant" portions of the system. Is it possible that a user can combine infonnation obtained from two different components of a system in order to learn infonnation that he could not receive from either component in isolation?
The answer turns out to be yes, as the next section shows.
1) Deducibility Security Is Not Preserved by Hookup:
A multilevel system may have many interacting trusted processes, so it is not sufficient to guarantee that each process is secure in isolation; it is necessary to also show that several processes working together cannot conspire to violate security. In other words, for trusted processes, it is necessary to have a definition of security that is composable. While deducibility security may be a good overall definition of security for an entire system, it unfortunately is not composable. In this section we will demonstrate this result by showing two processes which alone are deducibility secure, but which when "hooked up" form a composite system which is not secure.
In the following example, we will consider systems with only two levels: high and low.
Conventions and Notations for Systems: To illustrate the possible behavior of systems, let us introduce a pictorial notation for the traces, or possible histories, of systems. We depict a trace of a system by giving a timeline running vertically, with the future of the system toward the top and with the past of the system toward the bottom. Horizontal vectors directed toward or away from the time line of a system represent inputs to and outputs from that system, respectively. We will use unbroken lines to represent low inputs and outputs, and broken lines to represent high inputs and outputs. To represent two systems operating in parallel, we show their timelines together. A message sent from one machine to another will be shown as a horizontal arrow pointing away from the time line of the sending system and toward the time line of the receiving system.
A Counterexample: Consider a system, called ct, which has the following set of traces: each trace starts with some number of high-level inputs or outputs followed by the low-level output stop followed by the lowlevel output odd ( if there has been an odd number of highlevel events prior to stop) or even ( System ct actually is deducibility secure; regardless of high-level inputs, the possible low-level sequences are 1) stop followed by odd or 2) stop followed by even. A highlevel input does not affect these possibilities, because it is always possible for such an input to be followed by a high-level output, and the pair would leave the low-level outputs unaffected.
System CB behaves exactly like system ct, except that:
• its high-level outputs are out its left channel.
• its even and odd outputs are out its right channel.
• stop is an input to its left channel, rather than an output.
System CB, system ct, is deducibility secure. A typical event sequence of system CB is shown in the upper right comer of Fig. 1 .
If systems ct and <B are connected, so that the left chan- nel of CB is connected to the right channel of ct then we have the situation pictured in the bottom of Fig. 1 . Now we see that the combined system is no longer deducibility secure. Since the number of shared high-level signals is the same for ct and <B, the fact that ct says odd while CB says even (or vice versa) means that there has been at least one high-level input from outside. If all highlevel inputs are deleted, then systems ct and CB will necessarily both say even or both say odd. By looking at the low-level events, a user can deduce something about the high-level inputs.
Composition allows one to turn small information leaks into large leaks. Although the example above leaks only a small amount of information; it is not difficult to devise schemes for combining several slightly leaky systems to get a very leaky system. For some examples of how insecurities can multiply see [7] .
II. INTRODUCING RESTRICTIVENESS
An important thing to notice about the failure of composability for deducibility security is that, although a system obeying the property ensures that no single high-level input will affect the future low-level behavior, it does not guarantee that a pair, consisting of a high-level input followed immediately by a low-level input, will have the same effect on the low-level behavior as the low-level input alone. From Fig. 1 , it is clear that system CB does not ensure this latter, stronger form of noninterference. For example, the pair consisting of a high-level input followed by stop does not have the same effect as stop alone.
The additional requirement can be intuitively understood as follows. Only some facts about the past of a system are relevant for the future low-level behavior of the system. These relevant facts can be thought of as defining the "low-level state" of the system. The requirement of noninterference is that a high-level input may not change the low-level state of the system. Therefore, the system should respond the same to a low-level input whether or not a high-level input was made immediately before.
Restrictiveness is a property of systems which formalizes this requirement. 2 In the next sections we formalize restrictiveness as a property of state machines 3 and prove that it is composable.
A. State Machines
A state machine is a way of describing a computer system in terms of its internal structure, and its input-output behavior. To describe a system as a state machine, one must give the following.
1) The set of possible states.
2) The set of possible events, the inputs, outputs, and internal signals of the system.
3) The set of possible transitions.
4) The initial state.
A transition is denoted by
where ao is the state of the machine before the transition, e is the accompanying event for the transition, and a1 is the state of the machine after the transition. ' The Traces: Traces of a state machine are all sequences of events "I such that for some state a 1 start -+ "I a], where start is the initial state.
1) Input Total State Machines:
A state machine is said to be input total if in any state it can accept an input. The significance of this property for our purposes is that for an input total machine, one can only learn about its state by watching its outputs; no information is conveyed to the user by accepting inputs. In contrast, in a system which is not input total, one learns something about the state of the system whenever an input is accepted; namely that it is in an accepting state for that input.
By restricting our attention to input total processes, we achieve a technical simplification for our theory of security: information enters a system through its inputs, and leaves a system through its outputs. We will make input ' Goguen and Meseguer's notion of noninterference formalized this notion for deterministic state machines. For the class of machines they considered, restrictiveness and noninterference in their sense agree.
3In [6) a similar property was defined solely in terms of the traces of a system; states were not involved. totality a condition for a state machine to be restrictive, but this is not intended to imply that only such machines are secure. Rather, restrictiveness as a definition of security only applies to input total machines.
B. Security for State Machines
Once again, we will only consider the case of two security levels, low and high. To prevent a low-level user from discovering information he is not allowed to know, we first need to specify the high-level state information, and event information. We can summarize this information through the use of two equivalence relations, one on states and one on event sequences.
If a1 and a2 are two states, then we say a1 "" a2 if the states differ only in their high-level information. In other words, if to each state variable we assign either the security level high or low, then a1 "" a2 if the values of all low-level variables are the same in the two states.
If "11 and "12 are two sequences of events, then we say that "11 "" "12 if the two sequences agree for low-level events. For example, if the event a is low, and the event b is high, then the following three events are all considered equivalent:
A low-level user's view of the system, the state information he may know, and the events he may see, is completely determined by the equivalence relations on states and event sequences (both of which we will denote by "") .
III. RESTRICTIVE STATE MACHINES
A state machine is defined to be restrictive for the view determined by "" if:
1) It is input total.
2) For any states a1, a;, and a2, and for any two input sequences {31 and (32, if a) a1 -+(31 a; b) a2 "" a1 c) {31 "" (32 then for some state a z a) az -+(32 az b) az "" a;.
3) For any states a], a;, and az, and for any output sequences "11, if a) a1 -+"11 a; b) az "" a1 then for some state az and some output sequence "Iz a) az -+"12 az b) az "" a; c) "Iz :::: "11' Rules 2 and 3 say, roughly, that" equivalent states are affected equivalently by equivalent inputs, produce equivalent outputs and then remain equivalent. " This is a non-interference assertion; that high-level inputs and highlevel information cannot affect the behavior of the system, as viewed by a low-level user. Restrictiveness thus generalizes the Goguen-Meseguer definition of noninterference to nondeterministic systems. (For the particular kind of deterministic machines that Goguen and Meseguer considered, restrictiveness and noninterference reduce to the same property.)
One should note that an immediate consequence of 2 is that if {JI is a high-level input sequence, then it must not affect the state at all. Also, in rule 3, it is easy to show by induction that it is enough to consider cases in which 1'1 (but not necessarily 1'2) consists of a single event.
IV. HOOKING Up MACHINES If a and CB are two machines, then hook them up by sending some of the outputs of a to be inputs to CB, and vice versa. These common events will then be communication events, which will be treated like output events for the composite machine • l' :::::; 1" if and only if l' t Ea :::::; 1" t Ea and l' t E!Jl
A. Restrictiveness is Composable
If state machines a and CB are restrictive, then a composite machine formed from hooking them up is restrictive. From the fact that CB is restrictive, we get that for some state "2 1) "2 -. ' Y i E(]l "2 2) "2 : : : : : ; "I· Therefore, we have that 1) < a2, "2> -.'Y < a2, "2 > 2) < a2' "2> : : : : : ; < aI, "I>·
V. CONCLUSIONS
In analogy with the Bell-LaPadula model, we can require that every untrusted process be assigned a security level, and also require that every output be greater than or equal to this level (motto: send up), and that every input be less than or equal to this level (motto: receive down). It is easy to see that every such untrusted process is manifestly secure; it is necessarily restrictive, if we make all state information the level of the process. Therefore, an immediate consequence of the hookup theorem for restrictive machines is as follows.
If every component of a system is proved restrictive, or is untrusted and manifestly secure, then the entire system is restrictive. Therefore, any Trojan Horse in a restrictive system is harmless, as long as it is only allowed to send up and receive down, In this paper, we have argued for the need for a formal definition of security that is applicable for a wide range of processes, systems, and networks, The Bell-LaPadula model is not sufficient for this purpose, because while it defines security in terms of access controls, it does not provide formal guidance for the security of trusted processes, Sutherland's deducibility security provides a general definition of security for total systems, but unfortunately is not composable, and so cannot be applied to components of a large system. The final property described, restrictiveness, is generally composable and so can be used as a definition of security for small processes and entire systems.
